Libertarian State Leadership Alliance

Even in 1998

Already in 1998, author Claire Wolfe documented a whole variety of recent anti-liberty laws from the Federal government, including

A law requiring all states to issue drivers licenses carrying Social Security numbers and "security features" (such as magnetically coded fingerprints and personal records) by October 1, 2000 and requiring that by October 1, 2006 no Federal, State, or local government agency may accept as an ID any document not carrying Social Security number and other security features. Now Stealth Legislation snuck through Congress vastly widens the scope of these laws. Congressman Ron Paul, the sole Constitutionalist in the House, submitted legislation forbidding misuse of Social Security Numbers and other controlling uses of identification papers.

A report denouncing these cards from a conservative writer brings us up to date on implementation.

How will they enforce this melange of new laws? Read about 60,000 armed Federal Bureaucrats, some with machineguns and access to tanks and aircraft, a force larger than the armies of most of the world's countries. Congressman Ron Paul says that this accumulation of force is unconstitutional.

Under a new state law , residents of Massachusetts can't even get a dog license without providing their Social Security number.


Few responsibilities are more fundamental than the responsibility of each parent to assure that his or her children are properly raised and educated. The duty and privilege of performing that responsibility is under threat from the Federal government.


The FBI wants to sneak new laws through Congress, laws permitting them to snoop without legal restriction through your private life. This Libertarian Party information release gives extensive details.

 We are accustomed to believe that we are secure in our persons and effects from warrantless searches. What about our electronic communications? If you want security, you can encrypt your messages (use code). The Federal government has long said that their standard -- DES -- is entirely adequate, and has used treaties on munitions export to ban the export of stronger encryptation software. It now turns out that the DES standard is almost worthless, in that a quarter-million-dollar machine and a few days effort suffice to read DES-coded messages. If your company's secrets are worth encoding, it's worth your competitor's money to decode them. And if you used 256-bit DES, they can.